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Abstract: In his article “Adopting the Unadoptable/Disabled Subject in the Posthuman Era,” Fu-Jen 
Chen first examines three memoirs that demonstrate prevalent features of today’s narratives by parents 
with adopted children of special needs and next offers a theoretical and ontological investigation of 
disability. He suggests that we have to change the way we relate to disability: to recognize it not as an 
external limitation but an internal as well as pre-existent division and to re-orient ourselves to the 
ontological truth that we are always already “disabled/otherized” especially in the posthuman era when 
the body is seen to exceed existing boundaries of human topologies and to reinvent itself permanently 
along with prosthetic connections, accumulations, or consumption. Such a progress of “becoming,” 
though diversifying against the norm, does not necessarily challenge ableism and could be in tune with 
the logic of capitalism. 
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Adopting the Unadoptable/Disabled Subject in the Posthuman Era 
 
In this essay, I begin by examining three memoirs that demonstrate prevalent features of today’s 
narratives by parents with adopted children of special needs. The first two memoirs—Patricia Harris’ 
Loving the “Unadoptable”, and Jennifer Taylor’s Forfeiting All Sanity: A Mother’s Story of Raising a Child 
with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome—illustrate the traditional views of disability, one as a medical/biological 
dysfunction or a religious/moral lapse. Unlike the first two memoirs, The Question of David: A Disabled 
Mother’s Journey through Adoption, Family, and Life by Denise Sherer Jacobson distinguishes itself not 
only because the memoirist herself is disabled, but because she presents unconventional connections of 
adoption and disability with other sensitive subjects such as class, gender, and sexuality.  
Following the textual analysis of the three memoirs, I offer a theoretical and ontological investigation 
of disability—to examine the psychic work of the ableist that creates the cultural imaginary, rather than 
to uncover the vulnerability of the disabled people and their “disabled psyche.” I suggest that we have 
to change the way we relate to disability: to recognize it not as an external limitation but an internal as 
well as pre-existent division and to re-orient ourselves to the ontological truth that we are always already 
“disabled/otherized.” Finally, I tackle the issue of how to deal with the disabled “other” and adopt the 
otherness. The first two memoirs adopt traditional views on disability and their ways to deal with 
disability—ones such as pity, tolerance, and recognition—reinforce the disparity between the abled and 
the disabled, inevitably lapse into paternalism, and avoid encountering the ontological and structural 
otherness. Rather, beyond the traditional and social models of disability, Denise in The Question of David 
forges a new relationship with what Lacan calls the big Other and, by the end of the memoir, she is able 
to adopt otherness as a nucleus of being and identifies with the particular form of this jouissance. Again, 
I emphasize the ontological truth that we are always already “disabled” and so is the big Other. This is 
especially true in the posthuman era in which the body is seen to exceed existing boundaries of human 
topologies and to reinvent itself permanently along with prosthetic connections, accumulations, or 
consumption. Such a progress of “becoming,” though diversifying against the norm, does not necessarily 
challenge ableism and could be in tune with the logic of capitalism. It is subjective recoil and a negation 
–rather than external connections or unlimited affirmations—that help to dis-label disability and forge a 
new relation with the ableist Other in today's global capitalist economy.  
 
I 
As a part of the recently emerging voices of parents of challenging children, Loving the “Unadoptable” 
recounts the experience of the author as an adoptive mother who adopts an “unadoptable” child. In her 
personal reflection on parenting a son with special needs, Patricia Harris not only responds to the launch 
initiated by the social worker that “no child is unadoptable,” but she also demonstrates her belief in 
unconditional love and “Christian values with professional guidance” (59) that will help those children 
lead a normal life. Working in the pharmaceutical industry and involving herself in the Adoption Ministry 
at her church, Harris decides to adopt a child after years of failed treatments of infertility as discussed 
in the first chapter. The book then moves on to the lengthy exposition of the adoptee, Cory. With a 
violent birth father and a cocaine addicted mother, Cory—sent to different foster families—is labelled by 
his previous foster mother as “unadoptable” (x). When he was seven, he was placed in the foster care 
of Harris, who legally adopted him three years later. Covering a span of three years, Loving the 
“Unadoptable” charts Cory’s movement back and forth between home and schools, between hospitals 
and residential treatment centers. Acting uncharacteristically (demonstrated by his physical violence, 
emotional combustion, and intellectual deficit—all of which seem to prove how “unadoptable” he is), 
Cory has been diagnosed with an “alphabet soup” of disorders: ADHD, ODD, ED, LD, MD, PTSD, Bi-
Polar, and even “fishbowl syndrome” (33)—a term Harris herself invents to explain a particular pattern 
of behavior her son exhibits. Though her son lives in a world of “alphabet soup,” Harris believes that 
love is eternal (as suggested by one of the chapter titles) and that “a combination of science and God’s 
word” will help Cory to grow to be a “mature, responsible adult” (x; 55). The memoir demonstrates 
Harris’s faith in God, confidence in medicine, and wish for a sustainable future for the once-labelled 
“unadoptable” son.  
Similarly, Forfeiting All Sanity: A Mother’s Story’s of Raising a Child with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, 
written by Jennifer Poss Taylor, also tells a story of adoption and special-needs parenting. The memoir 
elaborates on not only how “unadoptable” the adopted child is, but also how unintelligible many issues 
are to the writer: Why do the birth parents lose their “sanity” to hurt their own child (both are drinking 
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addicts, abusing their daughter physically)? Why does the child behave strangely? The book title—
Forfeiting All Sanity—refers to the child’s forced loss of sanity due to the lack of malnutrition and medical 
treatments, next to the author’s willing loss of sanity on the decision of adopting the baby, or, more 
specifically, to her own failure to reason out inscrutable behaviors of children with Fetal Alcohol 
Syndrome (FAS). In Forfeiting All Sanity, Taylor details her frustration in understanding her adopted 
daughter, Ashley, when handling her daughter’s lying, stealing, fear, anxiety, hallucinations, addictive 
habits, destructive acts, poor personal hygiene, and many other problems. Like Harris, Taylor offers 
many spiritual references and quotes from the Bible and shows her trust in medications for her daughter. 
Different from Harris, Taylor does not conclude her memoir with her individual wish for her daughter to 
be independent in the future; rather, she insists on increasing the social awareness of FAS and demands 
“legislation to make it illegal for a pregnant woman to drink” (127). It is the religious mission and 
political cause (progressively revealed to herself in her writing of the memoir) that help finally regain 
her “sanity” and make meaningful her adoption of Ashley (126). 
These two memoirs demonstrate prevalent features of contemporary narratives by parents with 
adopted or biological children of special needs. In the face of an unadoptable and unknowable adoptee—
or, rather, an unlikeable and uncanny “other”—Harris and Taylor experience mixed emotions ranging 
from pride and excitement to guilt and depression, from gratitude and sanguinity to ager and anxiety. 
Confronting the “otherness” of their adopted children that evoke strong emotions, they, like many 
adoptive mothers, turn to the medical profession: as “otherness” becomes meaningful, it also becomes 
bearable. Medical professionals addressed as subjects-supposed-to-know medicalize those 
unfathomable manners through an array of “scientific” and “objective” acronyms. On the one hand, the 
alphabet soup of emotional and behavioral disorders may entitle one to financial benefits, social 
recognition, or legal protection. On the other, such an act of medicalization of disorders also suggests 
our “cognitive struggle to forge coherence from the inexplicable” (Garland-Thomson 189) and collective 
response to the “trans-historical ontological anxiety operating at a psychic level” (Shildrick 52). In an 
era with readily available advice on building and nurturing a strong, healthy ego, the presence of 
disability “upsets the modernist craving for ontological security” (Campbell, Contours 13) and the images 
of disabled children, in particular, break up “the model of happy, playing, discovering child” (Burman 
157). The threatening lack or excess of disability—either emotional or corporeal—arouses ontological 
anxiety and needs to be tamed and pacified. Medicalization is exactly a way to make sense of its 
disruption and to restore the ontological closure. Today, the medical regime functions as one of the 
postmodern techniques of bio-power that teach us how life is lived and managed. The medicalization of 
emotional/behavioral eccentrics exhibits how body and mind are regulated in accordance with the 
interests and discursive affiliations of the State. In these two memoirs, the medical profession translates 
disability into clinical concepts, reducing the adopted children to a list of symptoms. Yet, when the 
Medical Other fails—just as Harris observes that “over the years my son has had many diagnoses and 
his psychologist said there is not a name yet for his illness” (43)—we do not see in the memoir any 
challenge to the medical profession. In either clinical or linguistic terms, the diagnostic failure in the 
memoir does not disclose the incompleteness and inconsistency of the biomedical discourse; instead, it 
proves and even reinforces the image of her “unadoptable” child as an impenetrable other. 
When biomedical discourse fails to provide effective explanatory accounts (not necessarily treatment 
or cures), a failure that results in anxiety, Harris and Taylor turn to their religious faith for answers to 
problems and to their churches for support. Indeed, in the writing by adoptive mothers/memoirists of 
disabled children, religious rhetoric is prevalent. It is not surprising to see pertinent connections between 
the unadoptable/impenetrable others and the most enigmatic Other, God. In the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, believers are exposed to the terrifying abyss of the divine Other, whose desire and messages 
always remain unfathomable. And the enigma of His desire hystericizes ones into continuously asking 
“what you do want form me?” The same question also confronts many adoptive mothers in their 
encounters with the abyssal dimension of another human being, their adopted child. Like many Christian 
adoptive mothers, Harris and Taylor try to answer the demand and resolve the anxiety it evokes through 
love—to be exact, maternal love. Through maternal love, the question—“what do you (the divine God) 
want from me”—is shifted to “what can I do for them (the impenetrable children)?” 
Indeed, Harris’ Loving the “Unadoptable” and Taylor’s Forfeiting All Sanity reflect two traditional, yet 
still influential perspectives on disability: either disability as a religious/moral lapse or disability as 
medical/biological dysfunction. In these models presented in the memoirs, disability is identified as a 
problem to be scorned, fixed, and eliminated at worst, or recognized, tolerated, and pitied at best. A 
social critique of disability is thus absent in the memoirs.   
Complicating the already complex subject of adoption, Denise Sherer Jacobson in The Question of 
David provides further insights through the intersection of adoption with disability, sexuality, gender, 
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ethnicity, class, and motherhood. The memoir begins at the time of adoption when David was six weeks 
old and suspected of having cerebral palsy. Because of his potential disability, David was given up for 
adoption even prior to his birth and rejected again by a set of prospective nondisabled parents. 
Documenting the adoption process and the early childhood of David, the memoir ends at the time when 
David becomes an energetic, healthy toddler suffering no physical disability but minor language delay.  
What distinguishes The Question of David from existing narratives of adoption is not the adoption of 
an infant with a risk of cerebral palsy (CP), but the adoptive parents—Denise and Neil—who were both 
born with CP and use electric wheelchairs in everyday life. It is precisely the atypical couple—their self-
doubt, struggle, and being greeted with skepticism, dismissal, and even contempt—that add a deeper 
layer to this adoption story. Moreover, Denise in the memoir presents connections between disability 
and topics like sexuality, and parenthood. 
Addressing the convergence of disability with motherhood and sexuality, Denise confronts the reader 
with the portrayal of an “enjoying (m)other.” While the image of adoptees as an “impenetrable other” 
looms large in the above examined memoirs, in The Question of David we see a woman with severe 
physical disabilities who explores the life of motherhood and, furthermore, has a very active sex life. As 
a disabled yet enjoying (m)other, Denise, though with self-doubt and lots of frustrations, enjoys the 
role of primary parental caregiver, diapering and dressing David, sterilizing and filling bottles, and coping 
with doctors’ appointments. A caregiver rather than a recipient of care, Denise rejects the ableist 
perception of disabled women as deficient in “the dexterity and maturity to mother” (Mintz 144). Her 
nurturing acts unsettle the normative practice of mothering. Observed through the ableist lens, not only 
is her role as a desiring and desired (m)other disturbing, but her enjoyment of being sexed and sexual 
subject could be more threatening. How can a disabled body, considered “failing” or “lacking,” gain 
access to such excessive enjoyment? While the disabled female body is rendered asexual and 
unfeminine, it is normal/non-disabled body that is viewed as a proper desiring/desirable subject and is 
granted to access to full enjoyment. But Denise’s explicit account of sexual enjoyment challenges ableist 
norms of sexuality.  
As mothers of a special-needs child, the three memoirists face a critical challenge: How can one 
adopt the unadoptable and deal with its “unadoptable” otherness? To confront the enigmatic desire of 
the “unadoptable other,” we first recognize that the secrets of the Egyptians are also secret for the 
Egyptians themselves. That is, the “unadoptable” child is nontransparent to himself and an enigma is 
not only for us but for himself as well. In a similar vein, Žižek comments on the neighboring “other”: 
“the Lacanian ‘che vuoi?’ is not simply an inquiry into ‘what do you want?’ but more an inquiry into 
‘What’s bugging you? What is it in you that makes you so unbearable, not only for us but also for 
yourself, that you yourself obviously do not master?” (“Neighbors” 141). In Lacanian sense, we are all 
“opaque to ourselves and to each other” (Kotsko 56). In other words, we remain enigmatic and 
impenetrable not for the other but also for ourselves, because there is always an unfathomable abyss 
of radical Otherness that forever persists in us and simply because we are a being inevitably with an 
alien, impenetrable kernel. Accordingly, “what’s bugging you” is also bugging us and what is unadoptable 
in the other also resides within every one of us.  
In the face of the unbearable excess/lack of subjectivity, one’s first response is often denial. To 
disavow the foreign otherness that threatens one’s humanist notions of the whole, empowered mind-
body, the ableist subject may externalize the ontological impossibility and project the otherness onto 
those disabled figures. Then, the excessive otherness embodied in the disabled would be named, tamed, 
and further trained in biopower practices. The ableist either otherizes the disabled as deviant or 
infantizes them as non-divided, totally rhetoricalized. Either way is to mistake the disabled to be an 
imaginary being—one that embodies a denigrated “otherness” without subjectivity or becomes a subject 
without “otherness.” Any encounter with the disabled signals an over-closeness to the Real, the 
proximity that mirrors one’s vulnerability and lack, provoking deep existential anxiety.  
In the cultural imaginary, disability has appeared variously as a stigma, as “the master trope of 
human disqualification” (Snyder 125), as “the ultimate postmodern subjectivity” (Rohrer 41-42), or as 
“the ultimate intersectional subject” (Doodley et al. 34). Though we are living in an era in which diversity 
has become the new normal as Lennard J. Davis observes, disability is not just one of many differences 
or anther add-on to minority classification. Davis emphasizes that disability is “the ultimate modifier of 
identity, holding identity to its original meaning of being one with oneself. Which after all is the 
foundation of difference” (14). In view of disability as “the ultimate modifier of identity” or “the 
foundation of difference,” disability plays “a critical role in how we formulate relationships between 
ourselves and others” (Snyder 34). That is, how does one deal with the disabled without imagining him 
or her as the “other,” a mirroring self, or an abstract human being? Yet, prior to the examination of the 
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inter-subjective relationship, it is more urgent and vital to ask first how disability demands us to confront 
head on “within” ourselves—the most foreign as well as most familiar on the ontological level. 
 
II 
The ontological examination of disability does not lie with the vulnerability of the disabled people to 
uncover “the disabled psyche.” Just as racism is identified as “a problem of whiteness” (Shildrick, 
Dangerous 15) or sexism as a problem of men, ableism should be examined with consideration given to 
non-disabled individuals—definitely, to those who identify themselves as the able-bodied majority and 
compulsorily live up to ableist normativity. Ableism is a network of beliefs, operations, and productions 
that value health, wholeness, normalcy, and competency on the human faculties. The higher that one 
rises in the status quo of an ableist society, the more one invests oneself in that order that again 
demands a pursuit of more recognition, thereby reducing oneself further to a fixed template for identity. 
To challenge such ableist hegemony, we should understand that dis/ability is not only empirical in scope, 
but also ontological in nature. Dis/ability is a question that demands a more fundamental, ontological 
enquiry about the psychic work of the ableist that creates the cultural imaginary.  
In Lacan, human beings are fundamentally split subjects, divided, inconsistent, and alienated from 
themselves, with no possibility of “wholeness.” We are what Lacan terms “the barred subject” (258). 
Daly and Žižek explain that we cannot “achieve full ontological identity” and “always remain as ‘a bone 
stuck in the throat of the signifier’” (4). The subject is “nothing but the failure of symbolization, of its 
own symbolic representation” and is “nothing ‘beyond’ this failure” (Žižek, “Class” 120). The subject 
emerges not when identification (or dis-identification) is made but when it fails to be made. The failure 
is not an effect of the gap between the ideal and the empirical reality; instead, the impossibility of its 
full realization is immanent to one’s identification.  
Correlative with the creation of Lacanian subjectivity, one emerges as an ableist when he or she fails, 
rather than succeeds, in assuming the ableist norm of perfect bodies and minds. For the ableist, such 
an ideological normalcy holds out the promise of full jouissance and complete mode of existence. Or to 
put it in a different way, it covers up the impossibility of total jouissance and offers the ableist a way to 
manage its traumatic absence. Similarly to the functioning of fantasy, the ableist ideal is to “convert the 
subject's traumatic experience of lack into a more acceptable experience of loss [and to] produce the 
illusion that there is somewhere a satisfying object of desire” (McGowan 199). Today, even though 
normalcy does not dominate through the promise of wholeness, it still operates through being 
ceaselessly transgressed and violated as a background of reference for postmodern diverse identities. 
The postmodern-global-capitalist regime favors a new mode of subjectivity, one characterized by 
liberating diversification or multiple shifting identifications. The appeal to identification with either 
normalcy or diversity is, however, still functions as a disavowal of subjective splitness and the structural 
deadlock. Either way helps persons overcome a sense of alienation and imagine themselves in a state 
of completeness.  
But the image of the disabled other stirs up in the ableist subjects what is in them more than 
themselves and draws the ableist subjects into too close a proximity with their own disturbing 
excess/lack. The ableist subjects pretend not to acknowledge what they always “know”—in Žižek’s 
words, the “unknown knowns’’—about the ableist world: “the disavowed beliefs, suppositions, and 
obscene practices ones pretend not to know about, although they form the background of ones’ public 
values” (“Wheelbarrow”). They pretend not to know that desire itself is sustained by the dialectics of 
lack and excess. Normalcy is created to “avoid any anxiety stemming from lack or loss” with an 
identification with “a logic of the whole” (Ragland 262). They pretend not to know that one can never 
fulfil the norms because one always performs more or less due to a sense of loss in mastering an excess 
of signification of “normalcy.” And they pretend not to see the truth that no one is ever normal and 
there is always something “wrong” with us. 
In the face of the threat of otherness—both ontological and structural—the subject constituted by 
the ableist ideology either turns to embody the impossible/noncastrated position of full jouissance or to 
externalize the abject otherness by targeting the disabled figure posited as the exception, and, thereby, 
trying to label, complete, or fix the other. The disabled other, as a result, would become the cause of 
subjective lack and even social disharmony. Without locating otherness (shown as lack/ excess) “within” 
oneself, the ableist subject is inclined defensively to project one’s own otherness onto the disabled other 
and insistently to locate the disabled other’s “difference” and “particularity.” Thus, we need to recognize 
the otherness attributed to disability also as the truth about “ourselves.” It is exactly the unbearable 
sameness— rather than difference—that threatens the ableist’s ontological security. “Part of what makes 
disability so threatening to the non-disabled,” Thomas Couser explains, “then may be precisely the 
indistinctness and permeability of its boundaries (178).  
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While today's society advocates marginality, heterogeneity, and multiculturalism, one does not 
naively believe in ableist values and internalize the practices. Ironically, one believes indirectly through 
the Other—which can believe on his or her behalf. Moreover, the ableist Other doesn't need to exist 
factually, as long as it is assumed to exist. For example, ableism in the context of adoption may go as 
follows: “we also love children with disabilities, wherever they come from and whatever they look like. 
We shall not discriminate people with disabilities. But—the world is still an ableist place. Disability 
discrimination is still very much a part of our society today. To adopt a disabled child will make one’s 
life a lot tougher and the child’s life as well.” In an allegedly post-ideological era, such a detachment 
through the ableist Other enables one to continue to be an ableist and, yet, conceals his or her much 
deeper commitment to ableism. Today, we are living in a culture of disavowal and ableism operates as 
a belief or a practice via the assumed existing Other.  
Again, how do we combat ableism and adopt the “unadoptable” subject? In the case of disability, we 
do not merely acknowledge our disavowal of the fantasy about the disabled other or our 
projection/externalization into the figure of the disabled. We have to change the way we relate to 
dis/ability: a shift in the subjective position to dis/ability. To be exact, disability is not an external 
limitation, but an internal division—the prerequisite for ability. We can never be a full one because we 
are always thwarted by an immanent impossibility/disability. To put it in a different way, there is no 
pre-existing organic unity preceding loss and what is missing is retroactively constituted through the 
act to recover its loss. Disability is constitutive of the subject, in the radical sense that the subject does 
not pre-exist its disability, but emerges through it. The subject emerges through its own loss of ability 
(or, an original unity). The loss has already taken place and we are living in its aftermath.  
Accordingly, disability is not the effect of a norm, but what characterizes and precedes the ableist 
world. Though the disabled appearing in the form of an error to be overcome or an obstacle to the 
ultimate enjoyment in the ableist society, they are a people, representing the indispensable internal 
limit of an ableist society and serving as the fantasmatic frame through which the ableist society can 
retain its consistency and attain its enjoyment. The ableist world is sustained by disability as a 
constitutive lack and the ableist enjoys being “abled” and appear “normal” insofar as disability functions 
as a reflective barrier. If we subtract the fantasy of disability from reality, the ableist world disintegrates. 
If the disabled do not exist, the ableist world would have to invent them.  
When we recognize disability as an internal division and a source of enjoyment, we deprive disability 
of libidinal investment and create the possibility of the subject’s disinvestment from ableist culture. Of 
course, there still exist disabled people, but they would cease to be “disabled” in the way that we now 
understand the name. When disability is an internal and pre-existent division, we re-orient ourselves to 
the ontological truth that we are always already “disabled/otherized.” We are always already disabled 
not merely because humans, compared to other animals, are born biologically premature, but because 
humans, in order to enjoy themselves as being abled, have to be “disabled” beforehand. In addition, we 
are “disabled” not necessarily in the temporal sense that we, as temporarily able-bodied persons (TAB), 
are vulnerable to illnesses and accidents, which can happen to anyone at some point in life, or in the 
sense of the irreducible gap between the actual and ideal body, as Robert McRuer argues, that “the ideal 
able-bodied identity can never, once and for all, be achieved” (9). Rather, it is in the ontological, 
structural context that we are always already disabled: constructed as irrevocably divided, split, 
alienated against ourselves, we cannot help but desire/articulate/perform more or less and are unable 
to arrive at enjoyment directly. Disability logically and ontologically precedes ability/normality. To claim 
that “we are always already disabled,” I do not ignore the injustice of social and economic inequality 
involved with disability, nor do I offer the categorical indistinguishability of dis/ability as an easy solution 
to ableism. To end ableism, I argue, we have to change the way we relate to dis/ability. As Todd 
McGowan claims that “A properly psychoanalytic politics would transform it [the deadlock] from an 
obstacle into a point of identification” (263), we identify with disability, the deadlock of the ableist world, 
and assume it as a source of jouissance and possibility. Rather than targeting disability as the external 
otherness of the ableist world, we embrace it as our own internal limitation, not as “a state of loss” but 
as “originary” (McGowan 195).  
 
III 
After the textual analysis and the Lacanian theoretical framing above, the question is posed again: how 
to adopt the unadoptable/disabled subject? Many narratives, including the first two memoirs I examined, 
adopt biomedical and philanthropic views on disability. These positions are not inherently good or bad. 
Though often intertwined with the experience of exclusion and discrimination, medical treatments are 
not straightforwardly discriminatory: for instance, to be more “abled”—through measures such as vision 
correction from eye glasses to contact lenses, and from laser-assisted in situ keratomileusis (LASIK) to 
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refractive surgery—does not necessarily amount to a submission to normalcy, thereby a reinforcement 
of the ableist ideal. It is likewise that charity could not be outright dismissed as an obstruction of a 
redistribution of resources—the ultimate goal of justice. But without encountering the split subjectivity 
of modern individuals, without re-orienting toward the ontological truth that we are always already 
“disabled/otherized,” and without recognizing disability as an internal division and the internal deadlock 
of the ableist world, the biomedical and philanthropic views on disability are highly problematic. The 
former would be likely to comply with normalcy, executing a medical power of care and cure on 
individuals, leading to medical paternalism. The latter will fall into a politics of pity, spotlighting the 
spectacle of individual suffering via the disparity between the abled and the disabled, and between an 
observer and a distant sufferer. Neither of them aims at changing the entire cognitive mapping of 
dis/ability or settling accounts by investigating institutional ableism and violations of human rights. 
Without encountering the ontological and structural otherness, Harris and Taylor adopt traditional 
views on disability; their ways to deal with disability—ones such as pity, tolerance, and recognition—in 
one way or another reinforce the disparity between the abled and the disabled, inevitably lapsing into 
paternalism. On the other hand, the character of Neil in Jacobson’s The Question of David provides us 
with an exemplary figure of how the social model of disability is put into practice to create a true social 
integration. A reaction to the dominant medical model, the social model of disability diverts our attention 
away from individuals to society. In this way the social construction of disability targets systemic 
barriers, prejudice, and exclusion by society. While it is the social context that enables or disables 
people, the removal of attitudinal and environmental barriers helps disabled people to achieve 
independent living. Taken to its logical conclusion, disability could disappear within a context with proper 
design and ideological alternatives. Such an ideal barrier-free environment is realized in the bank where 
Neil works as an esteemed computer engineer and a vice president: in Denise’s words, “the bank was 
Neil’s haven. He was liked and respected. He provided a service and filled a role. Everything was so 
clear-cut and well-defined” (183). Of his fully accessible and inclusive workplace, Neil boasts that “if 
people can’t deal with me, they get fired. It’s their problem, not mine” (183). Characterized as “strong” 
and “rational,” “logical” and “detached,” Neil is the one who knows “how to handle situations” (39). 
Having control and full participation in workplace, Neil achieves sustainable, independent living—the 
essential tenet of the social model that fully accommodates disability. 
Though portraying her husband as an exemplary figure within a disability-sensitive environment, 
Denise shows a limitation of the model arising from the lack of attention to the negative emotions, to 
the intrinsic disadvantages of the impaired body, and to the transient nature of a barrier-free utopia. As 
demonstrated in the memoir, Neil can hardly handle emotionally involved situations since, in Denise’s 
view, “hurt and anger make him sulk” (39), defensively retreating into “his logic [and] distancing himself 
from the ugly emotions” (104). Besides, rather than a “neutral bodily difference” as defined by the social 
model of disability, physical impairment represented in the memoir does involve intrinsic disadvantages. 
Qualified for the role of “super crip,” who triumphs over adversity and overcomes his disability, Neil still 
suffers a restriction and limitation in mobility. No amount of social accommodation could completely 
solve the problem of impairment, as Tom Shakespeare observes: “even in the absence of social barriers 
or oppression, it would still be problematic to have an impairment” (41). In fact, a demand for the 
barrier-free Other leads to another demand that demands more demands and counters demands for 
demands upon or made by the ableist Other. Subjected to the ableist Other, one becomes 
psychologically immobile/disable, obliged to answer, fulfill, repress, avoid, and enforce the demand from 
(or on) the ableist Other. The more we rely on a utopian Other that is expected to accommodate all 
kinds of mind-bodies, the harder for us to break the shackles of the demanding ableist Other. The turn 
away from individual/clinical essentialism, however, could fall into another trap—“contextual 
essentialism” (Shakespeare 76).  
On the one hand, the medical authorities in the first two memoirs I examine do not encounter any 
challenge, even when the medicalization of dis/ability into symptoms fails; on the other, the social 
construction of dis/ability demands an impossible Other, though such a request can never be granted. 
Despite initially appearing on opposite ends of the policy spectrum, the medical and social models of 
disability both presuppose the existence of the big Other as a fully consistent, closed totality. Grounded 
on the disparity of disabled and abled identities, both positions are subjected to the Other, appealing to 
the Other’s recognition of a particular symptom/identity or a specific need/demand. Interestingly, 
Denise’s autonomy and agency as a mother is not achieved through self-conscious rational deliberation, 
but instinct or intuition. Indeed, a genuine moment of subjective agency and autonomy is not grounded 
on a big Other that fully functions and provides (in the case of people with disabilities) a barrier-free 
home, direct payments, and choice as well as control they can exercise over the care they receive. Such 
an illusion of agency and autonomy, even carefully nurtured, could be easily dispelled by external 
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contingencies. It is when she attends to her intuition and instinct that she is able to recognize the 
existence of the fundamental lack in the Symbolic Other. This lack not only forms the primary condition 
for the existence of the subject, but it also “creates a crack—a crack opening up possibilities for (a kind 
of) autonomy and freedom of the subject” (Watson 10).        
By the end of the memoir, Denise not only enters a new relationship with the big Other, but she also 
fully subjectifies the otherness (shown as lack/excess) within herself and adopts the unadoptable 
otherness on an emotional as well as intellectual level. An episode in chapter ten, “An Ice Cream Cone,” 
might suggest a possibility of Denise’s radical subjective change; that is, Denise, though not once and 
for all, is not caught up in a dead end of the signifier, CP, and is able to free herself from the gaze of 
the Other and mobilizes her desire without a fixed association with disability. On a weekend morning, 
Denise and Neil were greeted by an elderly man, who proposed a treat of ice cream. Denise’s depiction 
of the scene demonstrates an effort to mobilize the meaning of the elder man’s intention, to shift a 
subjective position to dis/ability, to adopt “otherness” as a nucleus of being, and, after all, to identify 
with the particular form of this jouissance. Finally, she can enjoy the symptom of her own that provides 
her consistency and jouissance. Indeed, we constitute our beings in relation to the symptom of dis/ability 
that produces consistency to the subject and organizes our unique form of enjoyment without the need 
of the support or promise from the authoritative, ableist Master. Such a new way to relate to dis/ability 
corresponds a new mode of jouissance and inverts the condition of impossibility/obstacle/antagonism 
into the very ground of change.  
 Ironically, Denise’s assumption of otherness as a nucleus of being and identification with her 
particular symptoms of jouissance might seem inopportune today because the subject is prevalently 
viewed as one that is no more caught within the spell of repression or lack. The postmodern-global-
capitalist regime favors a new mode of subjectivity, one incessantly indulging him- or herself in an 
activity of contingent identification as well as temporary embodiment. No longer constituted by a lack 
of some repressed content prohibited by the symbolic law, his or her desire is expansive, productive, 
and connective. While desire is of abundance rather than of lack, his or her body is seen as an 
assemblage of machines producing desire. The body, as Margrit Shildrick holds, “needs no longer be 
thought as either whole or broken, able-bodied or disabled, but simply in a process of becoming through 
the unmapped circulation of desire” (“Queering”). It is a becoming, not a being. In a homologous way, 
the disabled body becomes one with seemingly infinite prosthetic extensions: it not only exceeds existing 
boundaries of human topologies, but reinvents itself permanently, substantively engaged with the 
transformative potential of becoming.  
Along with more prosthetic connections, accumulations, or, rather, consumptions, the body in the 
posthuman era frees life from limits. Though once downgraded to the status of nonproductive labor, 
thereby excluded from advertising and society, people with disabilities are now specifically marketed 
within today’s prevailing climate of global consumption. Thanks to the rise of biotechnology and genetic 
technology, dis/ability is redefined as a commodity and transformed into services, products, 
rehabilitation, and medical industries. Dis/ability is employed to create a large economic market. To 
embrace a body with a proliferation of machinic connection, people with disabilities, however, are at risk 
of being reduced to the role of consumer and their agency to the practice of accumulation and 
consumption. Clearly, such a celebration of the new mode of subjectivity and a market-based solution 
to ableism are in tune with the logic of capitalism.  
In a constant process of becoming, we are endowed with our relations with human and non-human 
entities. “No human is self-contained,” as Fiona Kumari Campbell claims, “and our lives are constantly 
changing and (trans)formed through the context in which we move” (“Stalking” 217). In fact, the 
“becoming” of bodies (by means of connections, accumulations, and consumptions) has been already a 
daily occurrence for both disabled and nondisabled people: the connections with entities from a voice 
synthesizer, high-tech spring shoes or hearing aids to a cane, a walker, and a speaker; from an eye 
typer or electronic reading devices to eyeglasses, binoculars, and cell phones. Some considered as 
prosthetic assistances for the present time could sooner or later become another conduit, corporeal 
extension. Such a “progress of becoming” may diversify against the norm or become a new norm, but 
does not necessarily challenge ableism as already disclosed evidently in our daily life experiences. A 
practice embedded in the notion of “becoming” is far from a solution to ableism.   
Today it is more pertinent and imperative to recognize the ontological truth which I have repeatedly 
emphasized in the paper: we are always already disabled and so does the big Other that suffers from 
the same split and self-division. Again, to recognize disability as inherent in both the self and the Other 
(or, in other words, the subjective splitness and the structural deadlock) could help to thwart our life 
which is oriented toward an ableist myth of wholeness/lack, dependent on the social organization as a 
closed totality, and, moreover, complicit with capitalism in perpetuating accumulation. It is subjective 
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recoil and a negation—rather than external connections or unlimited affirmations—that help to dis-label 
disability and forge a new relation with the Other. Ableism cannot be easily dismissed out of our hearts 
and institutions only through unlimited connections or a cure on body. We can only dis-label disability 
through a cure on “signifier” with a new mode of “enjoyment”—that is, we have to become the subject 
who can fully “assume the heavy burden of defining one’s own limitations” (Žižek, Less 340) and attain 
satisfaction only through this specific mode of failure.  
 
Works Cited 
Burman, Erica. Developments: Child, Image, Nation. Routledge, 2008.  
Campbell, Fiona Kumari. Contours of Ableism: The Production of Disability and Abledness. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.  
---. “Stalking Ableism: Using Disability to Expose ‘Abled’ Narcissism.” Disability and Social Theory, edited by Dan 
Dooley, Bill Hughes, and Lennard Davis, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 212-30.  
Couser, Thomas. Recovering Bodies: Illness, Disability, and Life Writing. U of Wisconsin P, 1997.  
Daly, Glyn and Slavoj Žižek. Conversations with Žižek. Polity, 2004.  
Dooley, Dan, Bill Hughes, and Lennard Davis. “Introducing Disability and Social Theory.” Disability and Social Theory: 
New Developments and Directions, Edited by Dan Dooley, Bill Hughes, and Lennard Davis, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, pp. 1-14. 
Davis, Lennard. The End of Normal: Identity in a Biocultural Era, U of Michigan P, 2014.  
Garland-Thomson, Rosemarie. “Ways of Staring.” Journal of Visual Culture, vol. 5, 2006, pp. 173-92. 
Harris, Patricia. Loving the “Unadoptable”. AuthorHouse, 2008.  
Jacobson, Denise Sherer. The Question of David: A Disabled Mother’s Journey through Adoption, Family, and Life. 
Creative Arts Book Company, 1999.  
Kotsko, Adam. Žižek and Theology. T & T Clark, 2008.  
Lacan, Jacques. Écrits, A Selection. Translated by Bruce Fink. Norton, 2002.  
McRuer, Robert. Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability. New York UP, 2006. 
McGowan, Todd. Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis. U of Nebraska P, 2013.  
---. The End of Dissatisfaction. State U of New York P, 2003.  
Mintz, Susannah B. Unruly Bodies: Life Writing by Women with Disabilities. The U of North Carolina P, 2007.  
Ragland, Ellie. “How the Fact That There Is No Sexual Relation Gives Rise to Culture.” The Subject of Lacan: A 
Lacanian Reader for Psychologists, Edited by Kareen Ror Malone and Stephen R. Friedlander, State U  
of New York P, 2000.  
Rohrer, Judy. “Towards a Full-inclusion Feminism: A Feminist Deployment of Disability Analysis.” Feminist Studies, 
vol. 31, no.1, 2005, pp. 34-61.  
Synder, Sharon L. and David Mitchell. Cultural Locations of Disability. U of Chicago P, 2006.  
Shakespeare, Tom. Disability Rights and Wrongs Revisited. Routledge, 2013.  
Shildrick, Margrit. Dangerous Discourses of Disability, Subjectivity, and Sexuality. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.  
---. “Queering Performativity: Disability after Deleuze.” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience: Journal of Media 
Arts, vol. 1, no. 3, 2004, scan.net.au/scan/journal/display.php?journal_id=36. Accessed 16 Jul. 2018.  
Taylor, Jennifer Poss. Forfeiting All Sanity: A Mother’s Story of Raising a Child with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome. Mustang: 
Tate Publishing, 2010.  
Watson, Cate. “Identification and desire: Lacan and Althusser versus Deleuze and Guattari? A Sort Note with an 
Intercession from Slavoj Žižek.” International Journal of Žižek Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 2013, pp. 1-16.   
Žižek, Slavoj, "Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, Please!" Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary 
Dialogues on the Left, edited by Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek, Verso, 2000, pp. 90-135. 
---. Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. Verso, 2012.  
---. “Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence.” The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology, 
edited by Slavoy Žižek, Eric Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard, U of Chicago P, 2005, pp. 134-90. 
---. “The Empty Wheelbarrow.” The Guardian, 19 Feb 2005, 
www.theguardian.com/comment/story/0,3604,1417982,00.html, Accessed 16 Jul. 2018.  
 
Author's profile: Fu-jen Chen teaches American ethnic literature and psychoanalysis at National Sun Yat-sen 
University, Taiwan. His interests in scholarship include Lacanian Psychoanalysis, disability studies, adoption narrative, 
and Asian American literature. Chen's latest publication on adoption includes "Maternal Voices in Personal Narratives 
of Adoption," Women's Studies (2016) and a new edited volume on disability, Chung Wai Literary Quarterly, (National 
Taiwan University Press, 2016). E-mail: <fujen@faculty.nsysu.edu.tw> 
